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What Emotions Really Are
(In the Theory of Constructed Emotions)
Jeremy Pober*y
Recently, Lisa Feldman Barrett and colleagues have introduced the Theory of Constructed
Emotions (TCE), in which emotions are constituted by a process of categorizing the self
as being in an emotional state. The view, however, has several counterintuitive implica-
tions: for instance, a person can have multiple distinct emotions at once. Further, the
TCE concludes that emotions are constitutively social phenomena. In this article, I ex-
plicate the TCE*, which, while substantially similar to the TCE, makes several distinct
claims aimed at avoiding the counterintuitive implications plaguing the TCE. Further,
because of the changes that comprise the TCE*, emotions are not constitutively social
phenomena.
1. Introduction. Grifﬁths (1997) signiﬁcantly advanced the philosophical
study of emotions. Speciﬁcally, he argued that emotions had to be under-
stood in terms of a causal theory of meaning (Putnam 1975; Kripke 1980)
such that the term ‘emotions’ as well as subclasses of emotions such as ‘anger’
and ‘fear’ refer towhatever it is that causes so-called emotional behavior. Con-
sequently, philosophical inquiry into the emotions is inextricably linked to
neuroscientiﬁc inquiry into the brain basis of emotions.
In turning to neuroscientiﬁc work on emotions, Grifﬁths looked to a set
of theories that can be grouped together as the affect program hypothesis
(e.g., LeDoux 1996; Izard 1997; for philosophical analysis, see Prinz 2004;
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Kovach andDeLancey 2005; Scarantino 2012). According to this hypothesis,
the so-called basic emotions (Ekman 1984) are realized in dedicated neuro-
circuits that motivate behavior without deliberate intervention. For example,
the ‘fear circuit’ is centered around the amygdala and produces ﬁght-or-ﬂight
responses in response to stimuli that are perceived as threatening (LeDoux
1996). Token activations of this circuit are the brain basis for token instances
of fear.
The primary limiting factor to Grifﬁths’s seminal work is that he turns to
an outdated empirical theory of emotions to investigate their brain basis.
Another theory of emotions, the Theory of Constructed Emotion (TCE; for-
merly the Conceptual Act Theory), has been put forth by Lisa Feldman
Barrett and colleagues (Barrett 2006, 2009a, 2012, 2014, 2017; Wilson-
Mendenhall et al. 2011; Lindquist et al. 2012; Barrett, Wilson-Mendenhall,
and Barsalou 2015) and is gaining traction. While there are still defenders
of the affect program hypothesis in both psychology (e.g., Izard 2007) and
philosophy (e.g., Scarantino 2009, 2012), the TCE has been gaining in pop-
ularity to the point where one of the original major proponents of the affect
program hypothesis has recanted (LeDoux 2012, 2015).
According to the TCE, emotions are what Searle (1995) calls social ob-
jects (Barrett 2012, 2014, 2017). Social objects are a class of objects that exist
only because members of a community conceptualize them as such (Searle
1995). If Barrett is right, and emotions are social objects, then emotions are
what I will call ‘constitutively external’ phenomena. In ‘constitutive external-
ism’, an entity’s constitutive basis extends beyond its physical basis, in the
way that what makes me an uncle extends beyond my body and tomy brother
and his son. As I will demonstrate, emotions’ being constitutively external is
an impediment to Grifﬁths’s research program.
But before discussing how emotions’ being social objects is problematic
for the research program, there are more immediate issues. For the issues
that motivate Barrett to identify emotions with social objects create concep-
tual problems that themselves reduce the TCE’s power to explain emotional
phenomena. In particular, the TCE entails that (1) a single organism can have
multiple simultaneous distinct emotions for different perceivers, (2) we can-
not be wrong about our own emotions, and (3) infants and animals cannot
themselves have emotions but can have emotions created in them by a lin-
guistically competent person.
In this article, I aim to provide a theory of emotions that agrees with the
TCE on most of its major claims but addresses these concerns, which I will
call the TCE*. I then contend that according to the TCE*, as opposed to the
TCE, emotions are constitutively internal states, that is, states whose con-
stitutive basis is entirely in the brain of the emoter. To be clear, though, my
aim in this article is not to adjudicate the empirical case for the TCE or
TCE* put forth by Barrett and others (e.g., Russell 2003); that task, while in-
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teresting, has been done elsewhere (e.g., Barrett 2006; Scarantino 2009, 2012;
LeDoux 2012; Lindquist et al. 2012). Rather, my aim is to clarify what emo-
tions are if something largely like the TCE is correct.
The article proceeds as follows. In section 2, I discuss the TCE in detail.
In section 3, I discuss each of the conceptual issues mentioned above and
argue that each one depends on a speciﬁc motivation of Barrett’s for iden-
tifying emotions with social objects; I then discuss what changes are needed
to both assuage Barrett’s motivations as well as solve the conceptual issues I
introduce. In section 4, I turn to the question of whether emotions are consti-
tutively external phenomena. I argue that Grifﬁths’s project would be com-
promised if they are. However, I also demonstrate that, if the TCE* is correct,
emotions are constitutively internal phenomena such that a token emotion is
constituted by a token process of categorization wherein the emoter catego-
rizes herself as experiencing an emotional state of a certain type.
2. The Theory of Constructed Emotion. In the affect program hypothe-
sis, each (basic) emotion had a distinct neurocircuit dedicated to the reali-
zation of token emotional episodes of the appropriate kind. The TCE, however,
starts from the assumption that there are no ‘subpersonal’ systems dedicated
to any emotion category or even emotion itself: the subsystems which realize
emotion also realize, for example, ‘cold’ cognitive processes. Rather, accord-
ing to Barrett (2006, 2014) and Lindquist et al. (2012), emotions are catego-
rizations of the self, based on multiple subpersonal systems such as percep-
tion, working memory, and affective state. At the heart of the TCE is the
claim that a process of categorization, which renders an output with contents
like “I am afraid,” is constitutive of a token fear state.
2.1. Categorization in the TCE. According to Barrett, one of the main
functions of the brain is to categorize its ‘internal’ and ‘external’ milieu (its
body and environment). She deﬁnes categorization as “comprising two pro-
cesses: (1) accessing and activating a relevant category representation and
binding it to a perceived instance, and (2) drawing inferences from knowl-
edge associated with the category and applying them to the instance” (Bar-
rett et al. 2015, 89). The brain performs these categorizations based on input
from various domains, including perception and memory. And the brain can
use multiple domains to categorize a speciﬁc bit of input: for instance, as I
will explain shortly, to categorize perceptual input into objects of percep-
tion, the brain uses information from memory as well as perception itself.
Barrett (2009a) calls the perceptual input the ‘focus’ of the categorization;
it also renders a categorization about this input, that is, objects in the per-
ceptual ﬁeld. The focus is something like the type of input that triggered
a token act of categorization.
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Barrett illustrates the categorization process she considers the basis of
emotions with a description of the phenomenon philosophers term seeing as.
When seeing, for instance, a bee, for the visual system to go from the array of
photons on the retina, or even the basic shape-like representations it creates
(Marr 1982), to seeing something as a bee, which requires “categoriz[ing] the
sensory input using conceptual knowledge from past experiences” (Barrett
et al. 2015, 88). Speciﬁcally, it requires an organism to have information avail-
able about the concept, BEE, and apply it automatically and effortlessly to its
perceptual representation.
According to Barrett, the brain categorizes for an evolutionary reason: it
does so with an eye to promoting behaviors that help an organism achieve
allostasis, which Barrett deﬁnes as the process of “efﬁciently ensur[ing] re-
sources for physiological systems within an animal’s body . . . so that an
animal can grow, survive, and reproduce” (2017, 3). Speciﬁcally, categoriz-
ing an object in one’s perceptual ﬁeld promotes what Barrett (2012) calls
situated action, that is, behavior tailored to promote allostasis in the current
environment of the organism. She uses her example of a bee to explain how
categorizations support allostasis by suggesting behaviors: “For . . . people
who have been stung . . . seeing a bee might mean freezing. . . . Or they
might wave their arms and run away” (Barrett et al. 2015, 89). The reason
seeing a bee prepares us for action is because the information stored in an
organism’s memory about bees is not just perceptual, it also includes infor-
mation about stings, which are bad for allostatic success.
Barrett does not commit herself to a speciﬁc computational account of
how the categorization process works, but she at several times (e.g., Wilson-
Mendenhall et al. 2011; Barrett et al. 2015) notes the compatibility of her
account with the theory of situated conceptualization promoted by Barsalou
(1999, 2009). According to Barsalou’s view, the way the brain gets from an
act of categorization to a behavior is by searching memory for behaviors
that helped achieve the goals of the organism during past experiences when
that category was active (e.g., Barsalou 2009). The visual representation of
a bicycle might promote riding behaviors for those who enjoy riding bikes
because a token activation of the concept BICYCLE will activate a search
among token memories wherein bicycles were present to ﬁnd instances of
riding behaviors.1
Crucially, it is the same process of categorization responsible for creating
emotions that is responsible for perceptual inferences as just described: “In
1. Barsalou, as best I can tell, does not—as Barrett does—phrase the aim of situated ac-
tion in terms of allostasis but rather in terms of goal achievement (Barsalou 2009, 1283).
For those uncomfortable with the concept of allostasis, Barsalou’s idea of goal achieve-
ment might prove an adequate replacement concept. I discuss this possibility more in my
concluding remarks.
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the same way that your brain used prior experience to [categorize] . . . visual
sensations . . . it uses such knowledge to [categorize] bodily sensations”
(Barrett et al. 2015, 89). While the brain makes categorizations based on
all sorts of inputs (e.g., perceptual inputs, memory-based inputs), when it
is focused on affective input—usually, but not necessarily, a large change
in affective valence—the resulting categorizations are emotions (Barrett
2006, 2009a, 2017; Barrett et al. 2015). However, while affective states
are the focus of the categorization process, they are not all that is needed
for it: at times, brain states involving the same affective state can be correctly
categorized as states of either fear or anger (Lindquist and Barrett 2008).2
Consequently, more than affective input is needed: information from other
sources (such as memory and perception) is required as well.
Affect—our conscious, ever-present sense of feeling—is an internal sen-
sation that, according to Barrett, makes us aware of information about our
bodily state pertinent to allostasis. Affect is the way in which we are aware
of “interoceptive sensations,” which are themselves “the representation and
utilization of . . . the relevant statistical regularities . . . of the internal mi-
lieu” (Barrett 2017, 6). For example, a negative affective feeling of which
we can become aware might plausibly indicate an increase in heart rate and
blood pressure of which we are not aware directly and that, from the per-
spective of allostasis, would be better at lower levels. Categorizing this as a
‘fear’ state prepares us for action to alleviate the fear in order so that we, as
organisms, achieve allostasis at that time. In this way, the psychological pro-
cess I have described is, in Grifﬁths’s terminology, the causal basis of so-
called emotional behavior.
There are clearly some differences between the categorization involved
in seeing as and the categorization constitutive of an emotion (other than the
very fact that one is constitutive of something and the other is not). First, the
categorization constitutive of an emotion does not categorize its focus, our
affective state, as being an emotional state; rather, it categorizes the whole
organism as being in that state. And this sort of object of categorization is
distinct from perceptual categorizations, which ‘focus’ on perception and
categorize the objects of perception.
2. The cited experiment involves priming people into an affective state by being asked to
think of a past situation in which they were in that affective state. It is worth noting that the
subjects could have recalled an anger or fear state as a result of this primingwithout actively
categorizing their current selves as being in that state. I am thankful to an anonymous re-
viewer for pointing out this alternate interpretation of the data. That said, both interpreta-
tions of the experiment support the conclusion that emotion categories are not reducible
to speciﬁc types of affective state, as in the alternate interpretation, the same affective state
led to recalling states of either anger or fear across individuals.
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Second, when I categorize my perceptual ﬁeld as containing a bee, there
is, if things go right, an object, the bee, which my perception is about, and
this object existed before, and independent of, my perceiving it. Even if I
am wrong about there being a bee, my perceptual representation is making
a claim about what is out there independent of me: it is claiming there is a
bee, even though there is not. Yet in the case of emotions, the input to the
categorization process does not include anything, according to the TCE,
that counts as an emotion before the act of categorization (Barrett 2006,
2012, 2014, 2017).
Barrett is certainly aware of these differences: because of them, she
claims (2012, 2014, 2017; Barrett et al. 2015) that emotions are objects cre-
ated by the process of categorization. That is, when I categorize myself as
afraid, I am creating an object, fear. By claiming we create emotions by a
process of categorization, what Barrett means is that we add novel episte-
mic properties—such as those that suggest action— to a brain state that did
not have them before the categorization. A state of affect does not itself sug-
gest any behavior; once it ‘becomes’ an emotion, then it does. A token emo-
tion “creates meaning about the . . . value of . . . physical sensations, over and
above [the sensations’] immediate sensorial valence and arousal . . . when
physical sensations . . . are conceptualized as emotions” (Barrett et al. 2015,
103).
2.2. Emotions in the TCE. According to Barrett, emotions are the same
kind of entity as what Searle (1995) calls social objects. For Searle, there is
a class of objects that exist in the physical world but cannot be reduced to
their physical basis, such as ﬂowers and weeds being irreducible to plants.3
As Barrett rightly notes: “When a plant serves as a ﬂower or a weed, this
creates meaning about the value of the plant: referring to a plant as a ﬂower
communicates that it is to be admired and cherished, while experiencing it
as a weed brands it as something to be discarded. Flowers and weeds pre-
scribe actions that mere plants cannot: ﬂowers are to be cultivated and
weeds are to be pulled from the ground” (2012, 417).
The way Searle understands these ‘social objects’ is that they exist when
a community of people categorizes them as such: what makes a plant count
as a ﬂower or weed is not biological but a decision made by a community or
society. Formally, a social object Y exists when some X, a physical object,
counts (is categorized) as Y in context C (Searle 1995, 43), where a com-
munity is constitutive of the context. More generally, by ‘social’ I mean
3. There are also social objects, such as governments, that have no obvious physical ba-
sis in the way that ﬂowers do; emotions are therefore identiﬁable with the latter kind of
social object, as the physical basis is the emoter’s brain state. See Thomasson (2003) for
discussion of this distinction.
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something predicated over multiple people or a community (Bechtel 2009).
Searle’s social objects count as ‘social’ in this sense insofar as they require a
community or group as context; I will elaborate on their social nature in sec-
tion 4.2.
The relevant point for the moment is that Barrett reaches the conclusion
that emotions are social objects because she (rightly) believes that social ob-
jects are the sort of thing that is compatible with three major claims Barrett
makes about emotions: (1) we can ‘create’ emotions not only in ourselves
but in others; (2) emotions are, in a sense I will explicate, two-place pred-
icates; and (3) emotion concepts are culturally relative.
First, as I noted previously, emotions are objects that we ‘create’. More-
over, emotions are created not just in the self but in others when, for exam-
ple, I perceive you to be afraid, you are afraid for me (Barrett 2009a, 2012;
Barrett et al. 2015). That we can create emotions in others allows a (sort of )
explanation of emotions in animals. For animals lack the conceptual reper-
toire to categorize themselves as afraid, but animals can count as afraid
when we conceptualize them as such (Barrett 2012, 2014). Likewise, at
least some social objects, such as ﬂowers, are things we can create outside
ourselves.
Second, emotions are perceiver-dependent phenomena (Barrett 2009a,
2012, 2017; Barrett et al. 2015), that is, objects that are ‘created’ by a per-
ceiver (or, given the differences between perception and emotion creation, a
quasi-perceiver). Barrett therefore claims (2012, 2017) that existential state-
ments about emotions are only truth evaluable when expressed as two-place
predicates, that is, with a predicate place for an emoter as well as a predicate
place for a perceiver/creator.4 That the emoter and perceiver-creator need to
be expressed with distinct predicates reﬂects not only their perceiver depen-
dence but that the perceiver and creator need not be the same organism.
Again, social objects are likewise perceiver dependent, as perceivers are
constitutive of a social context, C, in Searle’s formulation of social objects.
For Searle, if there is no context of categorizers to, say, decide there is a
cocktail party, then there cannot be a cocktail party.
Barrett sees a third similarity between social objects and emotions: that
the categories of both are socially constructed. Barrett notes that “emotion
categories . . . vary as a function of learning, and in particular, how emotion
words shape concept learning” (Barrett et al. 2015, 96). Barrett documents
cultural variation in emotions as follows:
4. The number of predicates in question is the number of organisms necessary for the
mental state to exist, not the number of predicates in the content of that state. In the sense
of predication relevant to this article, mental states as generally discussed in philosoph-
ical literature are truth evaluable as one-place predicates. X’s belief that A F’s B if C, for
instance, is a certain belief predicated over X.
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Cultural variation in emotion categories takes various forms. Some emo-
tion categories exist only in speciﬁc cultures. For example, “ligit” is the ex-
perience of intense, euphoric aggression that occurs during head hunting
in the Ilongot tribe from the Philippines (Rosaldo 1980). Some emotion
categories appear to be universal, but their content and relational themes
vary. . . . The experience of “sadness” is more akin to physical agony in Rus-
sian but the experience of loss in the USA (Wierzbicka 2009). . . . The same
mental content can exist across cultures but be differentially conﬁgured as
emotion categories. . . . In the USA, sadness and anger are experienced as
separate and distinct emotions . . . whereas in Turkey sadness and anger are
properties of a single emotion category called “kizginlik” (Mesquita 1993).
(Barrett 2009b, 1284–85)
That emotional concepts vary across cultures in these three ways can be
easily explained by the TCE if we posit that emotion categories such as
anger, sadness, and so on, are culturally learned, or socially constructed,
which Barrett does (Barrett 2009b; Barrett et al. 2015). If the concepts
are culturally learned, then it is no mystery that cultures will either (a) de-
velop different concepts to describe their affective states or (b) develop dif-
ferent logical relations among the same concepts.
3. Conceptual Issues in the TCE. There are three conceptual issues af-
ﬂicting the TCE, which I will discuss in the following order: (1) a single
person can have in theory inﬁnite distinct emotional states, (2) we cannot
be wrong about our own emotional state, and (3) infants and animals cannot
have emotions without a linguistically capable adult to ‘create’ their emo-
tions for them. In this section, I show that each of these three issues is an
unavoidable implication of one of the three major claims discussed in sec-
tion 2.2. I then discuss in each case what needs to be changed to make the
TCE tenable; these changes comprise the beginning of my version of the
TCE, the TCE*.
3.1. Having Multiple Emotions and Creating Emotions in Others. Pic-
ture the following scenario. A patient, Portnoy, comes into his therapist’s
ofﬁce to talk about the latest maladaptive episode of fear he has experi-
enced. His therapist, however, claims that Portnoy is not afraid but is in fact
angry. Clearly, one of the two of them is wrong, and any good theory of
emotion needs to account for this fact. Yet according to the TCE, neither
is wrong: because we can create emotions in others, Portnoy is afraid for
himself yet angry for his therapist.
And there seems to be no theoretical limit to how many emotional states
poor Portnoy can have at the same time: if there are enough perceivers, he
can have exactly as many emotions as we have emotion concepts. And this
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conclusion seems extremely counterintuitive to say the least. Moreover, on
some philosophical views of the emotions, the claim is not just counterin-
tuitive, it is a conceptual impossibility. Helm (2007) argues that emotions are
subject to ‘tonal rationality’, such that positive and negative emotions contra-
dict each other in the same way beliefs in P and not-P would. On this view the
idea that I am afraid for me and happy for you is not only incredibly im-
plausible, it is downright incoherent. The issue, whether one of counterintui-
tiveness or actual incoherence, is directly tied to the idea that we can create
emotions in others, and the only solution I can see is jettisoning the claim it-
self.
And this issue, of whether we can create emotions in others, is itself tied
to the issue of whether emotions ought to be understood as two-place pred-
icates. To understand why they ought not to be, consider this. There are two
distinct senses of ‘creation’ relevant to this discussion, one that we might
call metaphysically interesting and one that we might call metaphysically
boring. Even if Searle’s analysis of social objects is ultimately incorrect,
it is, I think, quite clear that he identiﬁed a metaphysically interesting sort
of phenomenon: a class of objects whose constitutive basis is outside of a
person or people but that is created by people through acts of categorization.
But when the creation in question is simply a single organism creating
novel mental states in its own head, the creation is metaphysically boring.
For I ‘create’ new mental states in my mind all the time. Just now, I created
the belief that I had typed a new sentence ending in “all the time.” What it
means to ‘create’ these states is simply to perform a brain process constitu-
tive of (the existence of) these states.
The difference between the two senses of creation is that, in the ﬁrst in-
stance, the creator can create an object distinct from herself, or create a new
property of an object distinct from herself, whereas in the latter case, the
perceiver or creator can only create something within herself. In the ﬁrst
case, genuine two-place predication is required: since the creator and the
created are not analytically the same thing, it is informative to specify both.
In the latter case, however, the creator and (possessor of) the created are
analytically the same entity, so it is uninformative to specify both.
Whether there is any reason to consider emotions to be two-place pred-
icates turns on whether we can create emotions in others. And I have argued
that we cannot. I can now articulate the ﬁrst two changes to the TCE that
comprise TCE*: (1) we cannot create emotions in others, and, consequently,
(2) emotions are best understood as one-place rather than two-place predi-
cates.
It is true that, when perceiving other organisms in our environment, we
impute to them emotion terms and, moreover, do so using the same general
categorization process—and the same concept—by which we create emo-
tions in ourselves. And we do indeed ‘create’ a mental state when we cat-
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egorize another as afraid. However, the relevant mental state exists (and
motivates behavior) in ourselves, not the person we are perceiving, and is
better called ‘imputing an emotion’. Further, genuine ‘fear’ and ‘imputing
fear’ generate different sets of behaviors in the perceiver/creator, one prop-
erly characterized as ‘fear behaviors’ and the other as ‘behaviors appropri-
ate to responding to fear in another organism’.
3.2. Being Wrong, Believing, and Seeming. In the previous section, I
noted that it had to be the case that either Portnoy or his therapist was wrong
about his emotional state. What I did not emphasize is that it also must be
the case that either one (or both) of them can be in error. For Portnoy might
have a problem in admitting he gets angry: we can suppose that he is the
sort of person who regularly proclaims, red faced and aggressively, “I am
not angry!” when it is plain to all others that he is. A theory of emotions
must therefore be able to explain Portnoy’s disposition.5
If emotions are perceiver dependent in the way described by Barrett, it
seems that we cannot be wrong about our own emotions. For if Portnoy cat-
egorizes himself as angry, then he is angry. And, as Barrett repeatedly points
out, the categorization process is the same as the one underlying perceptual
inference, so he is clearly conscious of its outputs if not its inner workings.
There is a natural way to cash out the intuition that a person can neces-
sarily be wrong about her emotions even if categorizing oneself as being
afraid is constitutive of being afraid. What it is to be wrong about one’s
own emotional state, according to this line of thinking, is to have a belief
about one’s emotional state. There is a theoretical construct in philosophy
of perception called ‘seemings’ (Cullison 2010; Pace 2017); roughly, seem-
ings are the truth-evaluable contents of visual experience that persist along-
side, but can contradict, beliefs about the distal world based on experience.
For instance, the Muller-Lyer illusion involves a seeming of two lines of un-
equal length that can persist alongside a belief that the two lines in front of
you are equal. And the idea of seemings has been extended beyond percep-
tion to other mental phenomena; for instance, Oddie (2005) suggests desires
are seemings of goodness, and more recently Carruthers (2017) suggests the
same about affective valence.
If this line of thinking is correct, then the seeming would then necessarily
be true: for each token instance of anger, Portnoy would have a seeming of
being angry and would in fact be angry, insofar as the emotion itself and the
seeming are generated by the same mechanism.6 It would nonetheless still
5. I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for helping me frame the issue in this way.
6. There is also a sense in which the seeming is necessarily false: the existence of a
seeming state plausibly implies that there seems to be some object that exists indepen-
dent of the seeming, and as I have noted, there is not in the case of emotions. And it may
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be open to an agent to form a belief that she is not angry on other grounds.
Portnoy could have a seeming that he is angry and refuse to believe it. Such
a belief would be necessarily irrational, but that fact ﬁts the phenomenon it
is explaining: Portnoy’s refusal to believe that he is angry is irrational.
The TCE* should then add a third claim, that the categorization mecha-
nism constitutive of emotions delivers in seemings of being in an emotional
state, not beliefs that one is in that state. After all, the mechanism is the
same one that goes on in perceptual inferences, which (given the speciﬁc
sort of perceptual inference Barrett refers to) delivers seemings as well:
when I see something as a bee, it seems to me that there is a bee, even if
I know that I am really seeing a wasp. Barrett herself argues that the mech-
anism is also responsible for generating occurrent beliefs (when the catego-
rization focuses on the content of our thoughts; Barrett 2009a). But it seems
to me it would not be a substantive change for the TCE to claim that the
categorization mechanism issues in seemings, and something more is needed
to get to belief.
3.3. Innate Emotion Concepts and Emotions in Infants and Animals.
Humans are not the only kind of organism capable of having emotions.
When anyone in earshot sets off ﬁreworks, my dog looks for a space with
a low ceiling, such as the space beneath my desk, hides in it, and begins to
tremble. To interpret her behavior as issuing from anything other than an
instance of fear seems counterintuitive, since our concept of fear explains
perfectly what she does. In short, animals have emotions, and an account
of emotions needs to explain how that is the case. And, without making fur-
ther claims, the TCE* would seem to fail in this respect. For although Bar-
rett’s insistence that emotions are two-place predicates got her into trouble,
it also provided her a way to account for emotions in animals by saying we
(language-using organisms) create emotions in them.Whether or not her so-
lution is adequate (and I believe it is not, as it would be unclear how animal
research involving, e.g., fear homologues is to be understood if animals
could not have emotions in their own right),7 by removing the two-place
7. Further, if we can ‘create’ emotions in organisms that do not have emotion concepts,
it is unclear why we should then be restricted to only ‘creating’ emotions in living or-
ganisms and not, say, our dead ancestors. I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer
for making this point.
well be true that, if the categorization process constitutive of emotion also delivers seem-
ings, then the seemings it delivers are necessarily false in this sense. But I am interested
in explaining Portnoy’s issue and therefore the sense in which his beliefs about his emo-
tions are wrong, and that sense is necessarily one in which he can be either right or
wrong. Because this is the sense in which I am interested in whether beliefs can be right
or wrong, it is therefore also the sense in which I am interested in whether seemings can
be right or wrong.
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predication claim to ﬁx the ﬁrst issue, I have rendered that avenue unavail-
able.
I therefore want to suggest that some basic emotion concepts are innate
and possessed by mammals. If, for instance, the concept ‘fear’ is innate and
shared widely amongmammals, then it is nomystery how dogs can be afraid:
they have the concept for fear. Of course, not all concepts are innate, but claim-
ing that the concepts for the basic emotions such as anger and fear are innate
nicely supplements the TCE* by providing it with a plausible account of the
difference between basic and complex emotions.
As mentioned above, however, emotion concepts exhibit signiﬁcant cross-
cultural variation. Yet I think that distinguishing between the idea (plausibly
associated with the affect program hypothesis) that emotions themselves are
innate in a way that they come with a prepackaged associated affective state,
concepts, and patterns of behavior and the idea I propose, that emotion con-
cepts are innate, can account for the cross-cultural variation.
By an innate concept, I mean something like the concepts of ‘object’ or
‘agent’ that we are born with according to the Core Knowledge theory of
development (Carey and Spelke 1996; Spelke 2003). Roughly, concepts
that are innate in this sense have a ‘preprogrammed’ intension but a variable
extension and variable logical associations with other concepts. Given this
conception of innate, we would expect for an innate concept that cultures
have the same basic concepts but with different logical connections. For in-
stance, the concept SELF is plausibly part of Core Knowledge, insofar as
Core Knowledge includes agential concepts that require a concept SELF such
as RECIPROCITY (Spelke andKinzler 2007). Yet individualist (largelyWest-
ern) societies and collectivist (largely Eastern) societies have different under-
standings of SELF; the latter, but not the former, deﬁne SELF in part in terms of
relations to others (Markus and Kitayama 1991).
And, at least according to the ﬁndings Barrett uses that I summarized
above, the same-concept-different-associations idea seems to explain cultural
variation in emotion concepts. It would be completely commonplace for cul-
tures to have different concepts associated with sadness, as, for example,
Americans and Russians do (loss and agony, respectively). All that is required
is that both cultures have the concept sadness. And it is plausible, if not en-
tirely expected, that some cultures would create similar enough associations
to the concepts ‘anger’ and ‘fear’ that they would decide that the two belong
under the same umbrella concept, as, according to Barrett, the Turkish cul-
ture does. We can therefore add a fourth claim to the TCE*: that the concepts
for basic emotions are innate and possessed by at least mammals.
4. The Social Dependence of Emotions. In light of the differences be-
tween TCE and TCE*, it is worth examining whether it is appropriate to
identify emotions with social objects in the TCE*. In order to do so, I artic-
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ulate a way of judging whether a phenomenon counts as a social object and
argue that emotions in the TCE* do not. That they do not is fortunate, for, I
argue, if emotions were social objects, then one of the major advantages
of Grifﬁths’s method—that it allows us to explain emotional phenomena
mechanistically—would be called into doubt.
4.1. Constitutive Externalism. I claim that a phenomenon counts as a
social object if it is constitutively external and, more speciﬁcally, constitu-
tively social. Constitutive externalism is distinct from the more familiar con-
tent (Putnam 1975) and vehicle externalism (i.e., extended mind; Hurley
1998). In constitutive externalism, the properties that make something the
kind of thing that it is—what I am calling the constitutive basis of that
thing—go beyond its physical basis of that thing. An example will help illus-
trate this point. I am an uncle, which means that when my nephew says “un-
cle,” he is referring to me. The physical basis of his uncle is my body: its
boundary is my skin. But what makes me an uncle—what is constitutive of
my uncle-hood—is to be found outside my body.
Constitutively internal phenomena are those wherein the properties that
make them the sort of thing that they are can be found entirely within the
physical basis. For instance, what makes gold count as gold is that its atoms
have 79 protons in their nuclei; gold is constitutively internal.
The constitution of some phenomenon, the issue of what makes some-
thing the sort of thing that it is, can be contrasted with the causal-etiological
history of that phenomenon (Salmon 1984; Ylikoski 2013). What consti-
tutes, for example, a glass’s being fragile is a question of its current struc-
ture, and the causal history of the glass only comes into play indirectly. Of
course, it was its casual-etiological history—likely a manufacturing pro-
cesses—that made the glass have the microstructural conﬁguration that
makes it fragile, but that is not part of the constitutive basis. The glass’s
fragility is constituted by properties internal to the glass, its microstructure,
even if the history of those properties is external to the glass. Constitutive
internalism is compatible with what we might call causal-etiological external-
ism.
4.2. Social Externalism. Wemight consider ‘social externalism’ a spe-
cial class of constitutive externalism wherein the phenomenon’s constitu-
tive basis is social, that is, predicated over multiple people at the same time
(Bechtel 2009). A phenomenon would be constitutively internal and causal-
etiologically social if the constitutive basis is predicated over its physical ba-
sis, yet what made the constitutive/physical basis the way it is was inﬂu-
enced by social phenomena predicated over multiple people.
Social objects on Searle’s account and emotions in the TCE (and TCE*)
are both constituted by a process of categorization as such. Yet these pro-
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cesses of categorization are distinct. Crucially, the categorization process is
itself performed by a whole community in the case of social objects and by
an individual in the case of emotions.8
I will ﬁrst discuss social objects. For Searle, categorizations constitutive
of social objects are committed by a group process of categorization. Cru-
cially, this process of categorization is very different from the one described
in section 2. It requires very few of the members to actually categorize via a
psychological process; rather, it requires all of them to play certain roles.
We do not all consciously (or unconsciously) decide that our government
exists; rather, we act like it exists by respecting its regulations, paying taxes,
and so on, and therefore it does. Even in examples in which it seems like
only one person is doing the categorization, and doing it as a psychological
process, the rest of the community is implicated not by categorizing but by
playing the appropriate role.
Consider an agent at the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) who val-
idates licenses by stamping them. Each time she stamps a piece of plastic
with a picture and the right information, it becomes a license. In a sense,
licenses are licenses because she categorizes them as such. First, it is un-
clear whether she actually has to be performing the psychological process
outlined in section 2: she could be creating licenses by mindlessly stamping
pieces of plastic while on the phone. But even if she does need to perform
some psychological process that counts as categorization, it is not the case
that she is the only person required for her to be able to create licenses. For
some governmental agency had to put her in the position, and could take her
out of it, and (almost) all of us must agree to participate in a civil society for
a government to exist. And, people must care whether someone has a valid
license for licenses to count as anything other than pieces of plastic—if, for
instance, all the police stopped checking licenses on trafﬁc stops, it is un-
clear whether the stamped pieces of plastic would still count as licenses. So-
cial objects are, therefore, constitutively external: their constitutive basis is
a categorization process predicated over multiple people. Further, it is not
even clear whether the DMV operative actually needs to perform what I
have been calling the psychological process of categorization; she could
be stamping licenses mindlessly. The process of categorization that is pred-
icated over multiple people is therefore necessarily distinct from the psy-
chological process implicated in emotions.
8. In sec. 2, I claimed that social objects count as social insofar as they include a social
community as context. This answer was incomplete, as it was left unclear in what sense
the context of the social object counts as a part of it. I can now complete the answer: the
community counts as part of the constitutive basis of the social object insofar as it is con-
stituted by a process of categorization and that process is performed by (and therefore
predicated over) the whole community.
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4.3. Emotions Are Constitutively Internal. Emotions, unlike social ob-
jects, are created by an individual. In articulating her account of Conceptual
Acts, Barrett writes: “Plants . . . become ﬂowers or weeds . . . in a human
mind that exists in consensus with other human minds. . . . Other minds
might be absent at the proximal moment of perception [of an object to be
categorized], but even then, the realness of ﬂowers and weeds nonetheless
depends on those minds in some distal way, because other minds were nec-
essary to transmit the categories in the ﬁrst place” (Barrett 2012, 417–18,
italics added). Note that Barrett writes of the conceptualization happening
“in a human mind” and “at [a] proximal moment of perception” (where
perception is something an individual agent does) and that the role of the
social group is essential only insofar as “other minds were necessary to
transmit the categor[y] in the ﬁrst place.”
The psychological process that is itself constitutive of an emotion is be-
ing performed by (and therefore is predicated over) a single person. That
person is using information she (at least may have) learned socially. Emo-
tions are therefore an instance of a constitutively internal phenomenon that is
etiologically social: the constitutive basis is a psychological process within
a single person’s brain, but what made the brain able to perform that process
with that concept is the information the person learned from a community
during her development.
Crucially, we can only conclude that emotions are constitutively internal
from the fact that the categorization is performed by a single person if emo-
tions cannot be created in others. I have been, for ease of explication, claim-
ing that the categorization process is the entire constitutive basis of an emo-
tion. And it is for the TCE* but not for the TCE, as the constitutive basis in
the latter account includes both a perceiver and an emoter even though the
categorization process is performed in the perceiver’s mind. In virtue of being
predicated over both organisms, the constitutive basis of emotions would be
an external phenomenon: in the case of creating emotions in another person,
it would count, under my deﬁnition, as social.
4.4. Why Constitutive Internalism Matters: The Search for Natural
Kinds. According to Grifﬁths’s method, to understand what emotions really
are, one must not merely know where in the world the thing that instantiates
the schema of emotions is—in the brain—but how to describe those brain pro-
cesses in a way that supports generalizations. In his words, “emotions are the
referents of the [natural] kind terms of theories that deal with emotional phe-
nomena” (Grifﬁths 1997, 171, italics added).
Natural kinds are, roughly, categories in the sciences whose members
share a cluster of interesting properties in virtue of a common underlying
causal mechanism (Grifﬁths 1997; see also Boyd 1991; Wilson, Barker, and
Brigandt 2007; Pober 2013); natural kind terms are the concepts used to rep-
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resent those categories. This view of natural kinds is called the Homeostatic
Property Cluster (HPC) view; for each natural kind there exists a cluster of
properties, wherein each member has some number of those properties but
not all members must have the same ones. What makes the properties count
as a cluster, rather than a random grouping, is that they are all generated by
a common underlying causal mechanism; the mechanism keeps the properties
in ‘homeostasis’.
If a class of objects has many stable properties in common, and has them
in common because of a social practice, then these objects can be a ‘natural’
kind, and the practices can count as their underlying ‘mechanisms’ (Boyd
1991; Mallon 2003). Social objects such as ﬂowers might plausibly count
as ‘natural’ kinds in this sense: they have properties in common, such as
their desirability, in virtue of our social practices of how we treat ﬂowers.
While it might be more appropriate to call such a category a ‘social kind’
rather than a natural kind, since the mechanism is itself something predicated
over multiple people or a community, the distinction is merely semantic. For
members of these ‘social kinds’ have a cluster of common properties in ho-
meostasis just like members of bona ﬁde natural kinds whose basis is, for ex-
ample, the brain.
Now consider Grifﬁths’s (1997) criticism of another view of emotions.
According to the ‘ecological’ view, each emotion category evolved as an
adaptive response to a certain sort of pressure; for instance, an ecological
theorist might say fear states are those brain states that motivate behavior
and evolved in response to pressure from predators. Emotion categories
such as fear may well be natural kinds if the ecological theory were correct
wherein “the causal homeostatic mechanism of each ecological category is
a particular set of adaptive forces” (234). As Grifﬁths rightly notes, on the
one hand, “specifying an adaptive problem tells us very little about the de-
tail of the mechanism that solves the problem” (219), but on the other hand,
“one of the main objects of psychology is to get behind the behavior of hu-
mans and other organisms and discover . . . the underlying mechanisms”
(234–35). Likewise, if the mechanisms through which each instance of ‘fear’
or ‘anger’ (or each instance of an emotion generally) shared what properties
they do were really social practices, then we would know nothing about the
psychological mechanism underlying emotions.9
9. Mallon (2003) suggests that social practices themselves are reducible to beliefs about
those social practices held among members of the community, but even if this is true, we
would still lack a mechanistic story of emotion generation, since the relation between
beliefs and emotions would still be mediated by the practices themselves. For instance,
suppose that ‘anger’ instances are uniﬁed by social practices of sanctioning others for
norm violations, which are in turn constituted by beliefs about what counts as a violation
of social norms. My instances of anger are not constituted by my beliefs about norm vi-
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Knowing the psychological mechanisms underlying emotions seems
crucial not only if we value keeping the aim of psychology but also if we
are to answer philosophical questions posed by emotions. For instance, to
what extent we are morally responsible for either having or acting on our
emotions plausibly depends at least in part on how much (self-)control
we have over whether we experience or act on emotions. Yet how much
control we have over either experiencing or acting on emotions is going
to depend at least in part on the connections between the brain systems that
underlie our capacity for self-control and those that underlie our emotions.
The issue of constitutive internalism versus externalism is directly rele-
vant here, for there is a conceptual connection between a phenomenon’s
constitutive basis, on the one hand, and the mechanism underlying the unity
among members of a natural kind on the other. The constitutive basis of
some phenomenon can be understood as what makes the phenomenon the
sort of thing that it is. If the phenomenon in question is a natural kind on
the HPC view of natural kinds, then the mechanism underlying the cluster
of properties its members have in common is what makes it what it is. Thus,
if the constitutive basis of some ‘natural’ kind is a set of social practices,
then the mechanisms sustaining the unity of its members are going to be ex-
actly those social practices.
I do not want to commit myself in this discussion to comprehensive
claims about what natural kind terms the TCE* (or TCE itself ) warrants us-
ing. I do suggest, however, that emotion is a natural kind. Its members share
a great many properties, including the crucial property of motivating emo-
tional behavior to achieve or maintain allostasis, and they do so in virtue of
a common causal mechanism: a process of categorization, focused on af-
fect, that outputs an emotion category. That the categorization is focused
on affect differentiates emotions from other acts of categorization leading
to situated action.
According to the TCE, then, the constitutive basis of emotions, the per-
ceiver/categorizer and the emoter, is social, so if ‘emotion’ is any sort of
kind, then it is a social kind. But according to the TCE*, the process of cat-
egorization is a normal brain process. Emotions therefore have precisely the
sort of mechanistic basis they were lacking in the TCE, and emotion is a nat-
ural kind with a psychological, rather than social, underlying causal mecha-
nism.
5. Concluding Remarks. The TCE* started with four speciﬁc departures
from the TCE: (1) We can only create emotions in ourselves. (2) Emotions
are one-place predicates. (3) The categorization process constitutive of
olation; rather, they are constituted by something that is itself constituted by our beliefs
about norm violation.
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emotions delivers seemings of being in an emotional state. (4) The concepts
for basic emotions are innate and possessed by at least mammals. These
claims solved three major conceptual issues. The ﬁrst two claims made it so
that we can only have one emotion at a time. The third claim made it so that
we can be wrong about our own emotions. And the fourth claim made it so
that animals have at least basic emotions. From these claims—speciﬁcally
the ﬁrst two—I added a ﬁfth claim: (5) Emotions are constitutively internal
phenomena, not social objects. And from it, a sixth: (6) Emotion is a natural
(and not social) kind whose underlying causal mechanism is the process of
categorization.
Despite these differences, the TCE* retains much of the TCE. It retains
virtually everything discussed in section 2.1: a process of categorization, fo-
cused on affect, which results in categorizing the self with an emotion con-
cept, is constitutive of token emotional states. This process of categorization is
quite like the one implicated in the phenomenon of seeing as: indeed, insofar
as they both deliver in seemings, the process on the TCE* might be more like
the perceptual categorization process than the one posited by the TCE itself.
More generally, the brain basis of an emotion—what is happening in an or-
ganism’s brain when it is in an emotional state—is the same in the TCE and
TCE*.
I am tempted to add a seventh claim to the TCE*. Speciﬁcally, I must admit
concern about the claim that all situated action, including emotional action,
is aimed at achieving or maintaining allostasis. I am more sympathetic to
Barsalou’s (2009) claim that situated action is aimed at goal achievement
more generally and am myself inclined to think that situated action is aimed
at something like maximizing received reward. Yet while determining what
emotional action, or situated action more generally, is aimed at is a worth-
while project, all that is necessary for the TCE* to be tenable, and more spe-
ciﬁcally for claim 6 to be true, is that motivating actions aimed at something
similar must be in the property cluster of the natural kind ‘emotion’.
And there is still more to be discussed to fully answer the question of
what emotions are. In addition to specifying what natural kind terms the
TCE* warrants other than ‘emotion’, there is still the issue of ﬁguring out
exactly how emotions qua mental states relate to brain states. For if emo-
tions are not social objects, what are they? I have argued that a token emo-
tional state is constituted by a token act of categorization. Yet how to un-
derstand that constitution relation would seem to depend on one’s prior
metaphysical commitments: for reductionists, a token emotion is reducible
to a token brain state involving an act of categorization, for role function-
alists, token emotions would supervene on just those brain states, and so on.
Nonetheless, I believe progress has been made. Whatever one’s preferred
mental /physical relation, I have articulated which physical states are the ap-
propriate relata. And I have done so in a way that both renders the TCE*
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free of conceptual issues plaguing the TCE and allows for the search for
natural kinds in the brain to proceed.
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